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This paper investigates the potential for China's FTA with 
Korea and Japan. We examine the similarities of industrial 
structures and regional trade biases among the three countries 
as indictors for establishing a China-Korea-Japan FTA. Even 
though the three countries are at very different developmental 
stages, their industrial structures will converge over time and 
their regional trade bias is high. Regression results of the 
gravity equation show that the trade volume among the three 
countries will increase. Based on our analysis of industrial 
similarities, we suggest a step-by-step procedure for the economic 
integration of Northeast Asia. A successful China-Korea-Japan 
FTA can be realized through the initial establishment of Korea- 
Japan and China-Korea FTAs, followed by subsequent negotiations 
between these two FTAs.
Keywords: China, Industrial structure, Regional trade bias, 
FTA
JEL Classification: F14, F15
I. Introduction
As membership of the WTO grows over time, the organization for 
multilateral trade liberalization has become less efficient, especially 
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regarding negotiations. Bilateral trade agreements that were per-
mitted by Article XXIV of GATT have become more and more active 
since the 1990s. Though it remains controversial whether regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) will lead international trade in the 
direction of greater liberalization or protection, we consider that 
they complement multilateralism since world trade volume has 
grown rapidly with the increasing number of RTAs, while tariff 
barriers have not risen against non-members of RTAs.
The economic integrations in Europe and North America, that is, 
the EU and the NAFTA, have evolved into successful examples of 
RTAs. Meanwhile, the steps of economic integration in East Asia 
have fallen behind. During the whole 1990s, the only example of a 
free trade agreement (FTA) in practice in East Asia was the ASEAN 
FTA (AFTA), launched in 1992. However, a tide of economic 
integration arose in East Asia after the turning of the millennium. 
The completion of the China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) on July 1
st, 2005 
was a big step toward East Asian economic integration. 
With the successful development of CAFTA, a new issue at the 
center of East Asian economic integration has become the potential 
economic integration of China, Korea, and Japan. The focus of this 
paper is the possible involvement of China into the integration and 
the steps through which such integration should proceed. 
The common standards for selecting RTA partners include the 
structure of comparative advantages, income level, level of out-
standing trade barriers, market size, geographical proximity, intra-
industry trade (IIT), and intra-regional trade share. This paper 
mainly focuses on the industrial structure similarities and regional 
trade bias of the three countries. It is generally considered that the 
evolution of IIT increases total trade volume. If so, FTAs between 
partners that have higher IIT indices should bring more potential 
gains than those between partners that have lower IIT indices. 
Moreover, similarities in industrial structure and high regional trade 
bias will tend to ease economic integration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In chapter II, 
we explain theoretical background and present an overview of 
economic relationship among China, Korea, and Japan. Chapter III 
compares the industrial structures among China, Korea, and 
Japan. In chapter IV, we examine the regional trade bias among 
the three, using regional trade coefficients and the gravity equation, 
which estimates the determinants of bilateral trade volume. Chapter 
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V discusses the possibility of a China-Korea-Japan FTA, and 
conclusions are presented in chapter VI. 
II. Theoretical Background and Overview
A. Theoretical Background
The distinction between trade creation and trade diversion, which 
were firstly suggested by Viner (1950), remained central to analysis 
on the effects of economic integration. In Viner’s opinion, a 
trade-creating FTA not only improves the welfare of its members, 
but also benefits the rest of the world. On the contrary, a trade-
diverting FTA is just a device for making tariff protection more 
effectively. Lipsey (1957) found that countries might gain from 
trade-diverting FTA when consumption effects are allowed. That is, 
if losses from trade diversion were sufficiently small, the consumer 
welfare gain could outweigh the higher real costs of imports caused 
by trade diversion. 
Bhagwati (1971) made alternative models to show that trade-
diverting FTA might improve members’ welfare. But the world’s 
welfare as a whole will be deteriorated because trade will be 
diverted from more efficient suppliers to less efficient suppliers. 
There are many criticisms on the FTAs because of the possible 
trade diversion effect, but Kemp and Wan (1976) showed that if 
formation of a FTA kept trade volume with the rest of the world at 
least at the prior level, welfare of all parties could increase. 
In all analyses, trade creation is welfare-increasing, while trade 
diversion is welfare-reducing. Trade creation takes place when a 
member country’s domestic production of an item is displaced by 
low-cost production from a partner country. Trade diversion takes 
place when a member country replaces imports from the rest of the 
world with imports from the higher-cost partner country because of 
the elimination of tariffs only to the partner country.
This paper uses trade creation and trade diversion framework. It 
is difficult to draw theoretical generalizations about the conditions 
that may result in trade creation after forming FTA. One of the 
most successful economic integrations is European Union (EU). The 
success of EU can be explained mainly by two things; they have 
high trade share among them, and their economic structures are 
very similar each other compared to other economic integrations. It 
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implies that trade creation effects will be higher in a FTA, which 
consists of countries with larger regional trade share and more 
similar industrial structures among them. Thus this paper 
considers two things as conditions for getting trade creation of a 
FTA; regional trade bias and industrial similarities.
Krueger (1997) argues that it is generally accepted that the larger 
the share of trade preexisting among FTA partners, the more likely 
there is to be net trade creation after formation of a FTA. Likewise, 
when preexisting tariffs are very high (so that there is little trade to 
divert) or very low (so that the costs of trade diversion are low), 
welfare is more likely to improve with the formation of a FTA. 
Greenaway and Chris (1986) suggests that intra-industry trade is 
greater in the trade of countries subject to some kind of economic 
integration than in the trade of non-integrated countries. Moreover, 
the higher the IIT index, the more benefits can countries get from 
economic integration.1 Trade theory shows that the share of 
intra-industry trade is higher in trade between similar countries. 
Therefore, we can say that trade creation will increase in a FTA 
among similar counties.2 Verdoorn (1960) and Balassa (1965) found 
evidences of increasing intra-industry specialization in the decade 
following the formation of the European Economic Community.3
B. Overview of China, Korea, and Japan
After the growth of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 
which are known as the four Asian “tigers,” China has become 
another Asian economic miracle. Growing at an average rate of 
more than 9% annually since 1978, the year that it commenced 
reform with the opening policy, China has become more and more 
influential in the world economy. The rapid development of China 
1
Okuda (2004) adopted the IIT index as a working indicator for 
measuring the interdependence between trading partners and sequencing 
Japan’s FTA partners.
2
Elliott and Ikemoto (2003) shows that trade volume becomes larger 
among countries with different trade structures using complementary index 
in a gravity equation. However, it does not mean that trade creation will be 
larger when a FTA is formed among countries with dissimilar industrial 
structures.
3
Balassa (1967) showed that even if there were trade diversion in 
European Common Market, trade creation effects outweighed trade diversion 
effects.
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TABLE 1
MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF CHINA, KOREA, AND JAPAN, 2003　
China Korea Japan 
GDP (Million $) 1,416,593 608,124 4,300,858 
GNI per capita ($) 1,100 12,050 34,190
Openness (%) 60.05 61.56 19.87
FDI/GDP (%) 3.78 0.53 0.15
High-Technology Exports 
(% of manufactured exports)
27.1 32.15 24.06
Trade Share with Other Two 
Countries (%, Year 2000) 
21.5 26.05 16.69
Source: World Development Indicator (World Bank 2005), UN-NBER Trade 
Dataset (Feenstra et al. 2004).
has shortened the distance between China and its richer neighbors- 
Korea and Japan, and offered possibilities and opportunities for 
deeper economic integration, which in turn may present more 
potential developments for each country in the era of regionalism. 
In Table 1, we list the major economic indicators of China, 
Korea, and Japan. The size of the Chinese economy ranked in 
between Korea and Japan, at 1,649 billion US Dollars in 2004. 
Although the per capita income of China remains quite low, it is 
steadily increasing along with China’s rapid economic development 
and continuous efforts at population control.
Regarding openness, the Chinese government reduced its tariff 
rates for imported commodities nine times in the decade 1992- 
2001. After China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), a series of tariff reductions were also carried out in 
accordance with its promises to the WTO. In 2005, Chinese tariff 
levels were reduced to an average level of 9.9%. Table 1 also lists 
the overall “openness” of the three countries as measured by the 
trade-to-GDP ratio. China has grown into an economy with a 
similar degree of “openness” as Korea. Japan’s relatively low degree 
of “openness” may be mainly because of its relatively large domestic 
economy.
The increasing openness, abundant labor resources, low wages, 
and series of preferential treatments for foreign investors have 
made China one of the most attractive destinations for investments 
in the world. The net inflow of FDI reached 3.78% of China’s GDP 
in 2003, in contrast with the levels of 0.53% for Korea and 0.15% 
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for Japan. As it is commonly known, one of the most important 
benefits of FDI to a country is technology spillover. The large flow 
of FDI into China will increase the progress of its technology level. 
According to World Bank statistics, high-technology exports re-
presented 27.1% of China’s manufactured exports in 2003. 
To examine the economic relationship between China, Korea, and 
Japan, we calculated each country’s trade share with the other two 
in its total trade, and concluded that they are highly important 
trade partners for each other. This inter-trade with the other two 
members of the triad was 21.5% of China’s total trade volume, 
26.05% of Korea’s total trade, and 16.69% of Japan’s total trade in 
2003. It shows that each of the three countries has a strong trade 
bias toward the other two. Despite the variance in their develop-
ment stages, their economic relationships are both close and 
strong. 
III. Converging Industrial Structure among China, Korea, 
and Japan 
A. Measurement of Trade Structure 
The trade data we use in the analyses below mainly come from 
the NBER-UN trade data (Feenstra et al. 2004). The time series we 
adopt runs from 1990 (since the bilateral trade records between 
China and Korea started lately from 1989) to 2000, which was the 
most recent data obtainable from the dataset. We chose 42 
economies to form an economic group, which is hereafter called the 
G42.4 The total trade volume of 42 economies was more than 91% 
of world trade in 2000. 
According to STAN indicators’ industry list,5 four categories of 
industries are classified basing on different technology levels: a) 
High-technology industries, b) Medium-high-technology industries, c) 
Medium-low-technology industries, and d) Low-technology industries.6
In order to determine the relative competitiveness of each 
industry, we used the net export index. The net export index is 
defined as follows.
4
More detailed information of the G42 can be seen in Appendix Table 2.
5
STAN indicators database, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/
6 See Appendix Table 1 to get more detailed information about the 
industrial categories basing on different technology levels.
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where Xj and Mj are exports and imports of industry j, respectively. 
Aj can be seen as the index of comparative advantage. It is, 
however, affected by the country’s overall trade balance.7 In order 
to adjust for this trade balance effect, we assume that trade 
imbalance is equiproportional to all industries.8 Then the net export 















＝(1/2)Xj[  (Xj＋Mj)/  Xj], and 
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e＝(1/2)Mj[   (Xj＋Mj)/   Mj]
Xj
e and Mj
e are adjusted exports and adjusted imports of industry 
j, respectively. Since there were obvious bilateral trade imbalances 
between China and its major trading partners, we decided to adopt 
the adjusted net export index in the analyses below. Moreover, we 
used weighted averages to account for the relative importance of 
each industry, where the weights are the trade volume of the 
industry.
Nowadays, intra-industry trade (IIT) plays a particularly large role 
in the trade of manufactured goods among advanced countries. 
However, the rapid increase of IIT has also been observed among 
developing countries, especially among a number of newly indus-
trializing countries (NICs). Kim (1992) and Kim and Kim (1998) 
examined the deepening levels of IIT of Korea. The simple average 
levels of IIT in Korea rose from 19.8% during the period of 1962-65 
to 50.5% during the period of 1991-95. Furthermore, Korea carried 
on more IIT with other Asian NICs than with its other major 
trading partners. 
7
NBER-UN trade data (Feenstra et al. 2004) showed large trade 
imbalances in most of countries. It is caused by the fact that bilateral trade 
data were collected by import data only. If there are trade imbalances 
between countries, net export index is overestimated.
8
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For the measurement of actual IIT, the bulk of the empirical 
studies use the index proposed by Grubel and Lloyd (1975). The 






The IIT index (Bj) ranges from 0 to 1. When Bj equals 0, there is 
no overlap of imports and exports in industry j, that is, only 
inter-industry trade takes place. Alternatively, when Bj equals 1, 
there is complete IIT. However, if the total trade of a country is not 
balanced, the GL index underestimates IIT. Thus, we adopted the 



















 refer to the adjusted exports and imports of 
industry j, respectively, as defined in Equation (2). 
　　
B. The “Pot-Shaped” Industrial Structure of China 
The weighted averages of adjusted net export indices for different 
industrial categories were calculated between China and G42 for 
the period 1990-2000. These net export indices show that China 
continued to be a net importer of medium-low and medium-high 
technological products, while a net exporter of low technological 
products. And China changed to a net exporter of high tech-
nological products after 1992. 
We also calculated the shares of different industrial categories in 
total trade with G42 from 1990 to 2000. The shares of low 
technology industries tended to drop from 37.3% in 1990 to 
24.21% in 2000. On the contrary, the shares of high technology 
and medium-high technology industries tended to increase. The 
share of high and medium-high technology industries rose from 
only 5% and 28.58% in 1990 to 11.26% and 35.22%, respectively, 
in 2000. Meanwhile, the share of medium-low technology industries 
barely changed over the 10-year period. 
China’s net export indices of year 2000 demonstrated that China 
had comparative advantage in high-technology and low-technology 
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Note: Values in the figure are in percentages.
FIGURE 1
THE “POT-SHAPED” INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF CHINA, 2000
industries, while she had weakness in medium-technology indus- 
tries. It implies that China’s industrial structure resembles a “pot,” 
with the medium-technology industries as the “pot neck.” 
China’s “industrial pot” is presented in Figure 1, in which the 
horizontal axis represent the net export index (which measures 
competitiveness) and vertical axis represent trade share of each 
industry category. First, the right side of the pot is drawn 
according to the net export indices and trade shares of China’s 
different technology levels of industries, after which the left side is 
obtained by symmetry. 
The potential growth of high-technology industries in China 
deserves special attention. For the first time in its 10-year history, 
Science, Technology, and Industry Scoreboard (OECD 2003) included 
the state of affairs in the fields of R&D expenditures, human 
resources in science and technology for a number of important 
non-OECD economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, and it 
generated considerable attention for China in particular. Schaaper 
(2004) compared the indicators of OECD database for China with 
High ← Competitiveness → High








1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Chi na- G42 Kor ea- G42 Japan- G42
Notes: 1) The net export indices are adjusted net export indices, by 
weighted average, on a multilateral basis. 
        2) The definition of high- and medium-high-technology industries is 
the same as that used in Appendix Table 1.  
Source: UN-NBER data (Feenstra et al. 2004); by author’s calculation.
FIGURE 2
NET EXPORT INDICES OF CHINA, KOREA, AND JAPAN WITH G42 
IN THE HIGH- AND MEDIUM-HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES, 
1990-2000, IN PERCENTAGES
those for other developed countries. He concluded that China is 
catching up rapidly with other dynamic Asian economies and OECD 
economies on a score of technology indicators.
C. Converging Industrial Structure among China, Korea, and Japan
To compare the industry structures of China, Korea, and Japan, 
we focus on the high- and medium-high technology level of 
industries, and consider them as a group, since those industries 
are generally R&D intensive industries. 
Since the G42 represents more than 91% of the total world 
trade, we can also use it to approximate “the rest of the world.” 
Figure 2 compares the net export indices of the high- and 
medium-high-technology industries of China, Korea, and Japan. In 
this figure, China continued to be a net importer of the high- and 
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TABLE 2















1990 12.36 14.69 21.25 28.83 27.48 39.84 
1991 13.54 15.77 22.52 26.88 29.64 40.36 
1992 14.49 16.56 21.78 32.17 30.90 39.91 
1993 16.06 16.20 21.88 36.26 33.60 39.03 
1994 16.84 17.89 22.10 39.66 33.06 41.70 
1995 18.02 18.39 22.73 41.35 36.33 41.09
1996 19.16 19.37 23.57 38.56 34.57 42.81
1997 19.76 20.28 24.59 40.55 37.13 46.61
1998 20.19 18.74 24.44 40.37 37.72 48.58
1999 21.46 20.76 24.46 41.70 36.46 46.78
2000 22.10 21.33 25.07 41.08 35.14 49.67
Note: The IIT indices are the unweighted average level of Aquino indices, on 
a bilateral basis.
Source: UN-NBER data (Feenstra et al. 2004); by author’s calculation.
medium-high-technological products, while Japan continued to be a 
net exporter. The net export indices of those Korean industries 
were located between China and Japan. Before 1994, Korea was a 
net importer of high- and medium-high-technology products, but it 
has transformed into a net exporter of those products since 1994. 
The figure shows that the net export indices of Japan tended to 
reduce, while those of China and Korea tended to increase. 
Although China’s competitiveness in the high- and medium-high- 
technological industries has remained lower than that of Korea and 
Japan, the three countries have demonstrated a converging 
tendency.
Furthermore, the IIT indices of China, Korea, and Japan also 
indicated a deepening and converging trend. In 1990, the average 
bilateral IIT index between China and the G42 was 12.36% and 
that between Korea and the G42 was 14.69%, whereas that 
between Japan and the G42 was 21.25%. However, by 2000 the 
average bilateral IIT indices for the three countries had all 
converged to be within the range from 21% to 26% (Table 2). 
We also calculated the bilateral IIT indices between China, Korea, 
and Japan. The bilateral IIT indices among China, Korea, and 
Japan were about two times larger than the IIT indices of each 








1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
C- K C- J K- J
Note: The IIT indices are the unweighted average level of Aquino indices, on 
a bilateral basis.
Source: UN-NBER data (Feenstra et al. 2004); by author’s calculation.
FIGURE 3
BILATERAL IIT INDICES OF CHINA, KOREA, AND JAPAN IN HIGH- AND 
MEDIUM-HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES, 1990-2000, IN PERCENTAGES
country with the G42 throughout the 10-year period from 1990 to 
2000. This indicates that the IIT among China, Korea, and Japan 
was around twice as large as their trade with the rest of the world. 
Although bilateral trade between China and Korea started late, 
both trade volumes and IIT grew rapidly. Bilateral IIT indices 
between them rose from nearly 29% in 1990 to over 41% in 2000. 
The IIT indices between China and Japan were the lowest among 
the three sets of bilateral trade, whereas those between Korea and 
Japan were the highest among the three pairs of NEA economies. 
To take a more detailed look, we examined the IIT of the high- 
and medium-high-technology industries between China, Korea, and 
Japan. The results, presented in Figure 3, show a similar story to 
those of Table 2. In the area of the high- and medium-high- 
technology industries, the IIT indices between Korea and Japan 
were the highest in most of the years, followed by those between 
China and Korea and finally by those between China and Japan. 
However, all showed an increasing trend. Increasing IIT among 
three countries implies that their industrial structures have become 
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similar over time since the share of IIT is higher between countries 
with similar industrial structures.9
IV. Regional Trade Bias among China, Korea, and Japan
A. Regional Trade Bias
Trade diversion effects of economic integration can be reduced 
when there is larger intra-regional trade among member countries 
before establishing an FTA. To determine the degree of inter- 
dependence among China, Korea, and Japan, we estimate the 







　　Trr  : Intra-Regional Total Trade
　　Trw : Region’s Total Trade 
　　Tww: World’s Total Trade
　　
When K＝1, there is no regional bias; when K＞1, the region 
shows regional bias; while when K＜1, the region is less 
inter-dependence. 
The regional trade coefficients for China-Korea-Japan, NAFTA, 
and the EU are given in Table 3. Even though the China-Korea- 
Japan region showed the lowest regional bias, the regional 
coefficients of the China-Korea-Japan region were larger than one, 
which confirms that China, Korea, and Japan had regional trade 
biases compared with the rest of the world, as we noted in section 
III-B above. Regional coefficients of NAFTA were the highest among 
the three regions. Although intra-regional trade shares of the EU 
were high at around 60-70% in the 1990s, its regional trade 
coefficients were nonetheless lower than those of NAFTA. 
9
IIT can be decomposed into horizontal IIT (IIT of similar quality goods) 
and vertical IIT (IIT of different quality goods). We think that vertical IIT 
takes a large portion of in trade between three countries, because their 
technology levels are relatively different each other.
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TABLE 3
REGIONAL BIAS COEFFICIENTS, CHINA-KOREA-JAPAN, 
NAFTA AND THE EU, 1990-2000
Year China-Korea-Japan NAFTA EU
1990 1.10 2.08 1.40
1991 1.11 2.07 1.52
1992 1.13 2.15 1.57
1993 1.16 2.05 1.65
1994 1.25 2.07 1.66
1995 1.32 2.14 1.64
1996 1.39 2.19 1.67
1997 1.38 2.10 1.70
1998 1.39 2.09 1.63
1999 1.43 2.07 1.68
2000 1.39 2.10 1.73
Source: UN-NBER data (Feenstra et al. 2004), by author’s calculation.
B. The Gravity Equation
Frankel and Romer (1999) argued that countries’ geographic 
characteristics have important effects on trade, and are plausibly 
uncorrelated with other determinants of income. According to 
Frankel et al. (1997), there are at least three reasons why the role 
of distance is important in bilateral patterns of trade. First, 
distance leads to regional agglomeration. Second, distance between 
a pair of countries is an important natural determinant of the 
volume of trade between them. Third, countries that are located 
closely together constitute a natural trading bloc and for these 
countries a reduction in trade barriers can be economically 
beneficial. Thus, when looking at trade data, adjusting bilateral 
data for distance is a helpful way of explaining trade patterns or 
trade volumes.
Since our plan is to examine data on bilateral trade between 
pairs of economies in order to determine the influence of 
geographical proximity versus preferential trading policies in 
creating regional concentration in trade, the natural framework to 
explore this issue is the gravity model of bilateral trade.10
10
Related researches are Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand 
(1990), Frankel et al. (1997), and Deardorff (1998). According to Krueger 
(1999), the theoretical foundations for gravity models are not strong, but 
these models perform well empirically and are useful for estimating changes 
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The basic form of the gravity model states that trade between 
countries i and j is proportional to the product of GDPi and GDPj 
and inversely related to the distance between them. The gravity 
model of bilateral trade flow in our test is: 
　　
LogVTij＝β0＋β1logGDPij＋β2DISTij＋logβ3logFDIij＋β4logIITij＋
　     β5logGPCGAPij＋γ1EUij＋γ2NAFTAij＋γ3NEAij＋ε　        　(6)
where,
LogVTij＝log value of bilateral trade between economies i and j
LogGDPij＝log (GDPi*GDPj), where GDP is gross domestic product 
LogDISTij＝log value of bilateral distance between economies i and j
LogFDIij＝log(FDIi*FDIj), where FDI is net flow of foreign direct 
investment
LogIITij＝log value of bilateral IIT index between economies i and j 
in manufacturing products  
LogGPCGAPij＝log value of GDP per capita difference between 
economies i and j
EUij: equals 1 when both economies (i and j) in the pair belong 
to EU, else 0  
NAFTAij: equals 1 when both economies in the pair belong to 
NAFTA, else 0  
NEAij: equals 1 when both economies in the pair belong to the 
NEA region.
Trade data comes from the NBER-UN trade data (Feenstra et al. 
2004), and GDP and FDI data are from World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2005). Data for bilateral distance between 
economies are from Gleditsch and Ward (2001). 
The results are shown in Table 4. Most of the coefficients were 
estimated to be significant, and the estimated signs generally 
matched our expectations. As anticipated, the GDP variable was 
estimated to significantly affect bilateral trade flows. The summary 
showed that when GDP increased by 1%, bilateral trade increased 
by 0.395% in general. As expected, bilateral distance had a 
significant and negative effect on bilateral trade. A one percent 
increase of distance between trading partners tended to reduce 
bilateral trade flows by 0.36% generally. 
in the trading relationships among countries.
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TABLE 4









































































F Value 718.54 109.13 161.55
R Square 0.6843 0.6778 0.6733
Observation 5985 423 635
Notes: 1) Asterisks (*) marks attached to each estimated coefficient signify 
the following degree of statistical significance: *** (1% or less);    
** (5% or less); * (10% or less). 
      2) Year dummy variables were used to the regression for year 
1990-2000. However, the results of the year dummies are not 
listed in this table to save space.
We considered the effects of FDI on the bilateral trade to be 
ambiguous since FDI may be either a complementary or competitive 
source of international trade, depending largely on the motive of 
the foreign investor. If the target of the investment is to enlarge 
market share in the hosting country, FDI will have a negative effect 
on international trade, whereas if the target is the investor’s 
domestic market or other third markets, FDI tends to increase 
international trade, in both intermediate goods and finished 
products simultaneously. In our summary result, FDI flows had 
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significantly negative effects on bilateral world trade. A one percent 
increase in FDI flow tended to reduce bilateral trade by 0.073%. 
The IIT index was always highly significant to the bilateral trade 
in our regression results. A one-percent increase in bilateral IIT 
tended to raise bilateral trade flow by 0.97% in general. However, 
one should note that the bilateral IIT variables might cause 
multicollinearity with other explanatory variables such as the 
FDI-related variables.11
NAFTA, the EU and the China-Korea-Japan region (NEA) were 
adopted as dummy variables in our gravity equation. When both 
parties in the pair entered the same trading bloc, the dummy 
variable was assigned the value of one, or otherwise zero. We 
expected that countries in the same trading blocs would trade more 
with each other than with outsiders, so we expected these dummy 
variables to exhibit positive values. The NAFTA variable continued 
to be significantly positive, while the effects of the two other 
trading blocs were more complex. The negative sign of the EU 
dummy variable may mean that considering all the factors 
mentioned above (distance and culture similarity), the member 
countries should have traded more than they actually did. On the 
contrary, the NEA dummy variable was significantly positive in 
general. The coefficient of the NEA dummy was insignificantly 
positive for 1990, but by 2000 its magnitude had increased to a 
significant level. The results indicate the increasing importance of 
the inter-trade between China, Korea, and Japan. 
The regression results in our analyses suggested that IIT tended 
to boost bilateral trade flows. Therefore, the forecasted increase of 
IIT is anticipated to raise total trade volume at a higher rate, even 
with all the other variables fixed. Moreover, China, Korea, and 
Japan showed a significant trend of increasing bilateral inter-trade. 
Arranging a freer trade environment among them should bring 
potential benefits.
V. Possibility of the China-Korea-Japan FTA
The establishment of a China-Korea-Japan FTA is critical to full 
East Asian economic integration, since it contains the three most 
11 Ishido (2003) pointed out a correlation between bilateral FDI and 
vertical IIT indices.
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important economies in East Asia. The regionalization coefficients 
and regression results suggested that the three major NEA 
economies have a large intra-regional trade bias. However, 
significant difficulties in establishing a China-Korea-Japan FTA 
remain, with the biggest barrier being the relationship between 
China and Japan. 
As well as the political and historical problems (highly important 
though, not factored in our discussion), the great difference in 
economic developments can be another obstacle between these 
nations. China is a developing country, Korea is rapidly app-
roaching developed status, and Japan is a highly developed 
country. The IIT indices between China and Japan were the lowest 
among the three bilateral indices because of their greatest 
divergence of developmental level. 
However, difference does not mean an absence of possibilities 
and profits in bilateral FTAs. Various indicators show that the 
economic integration among China, Korea, and Japan is similar to 
that among the three members of NAFTA. Mexico and the USA are 
also in greatly different developmental levels. NAFTA’s successful 
economic integration can form a guidance template for similar 
integration among the three NEA economies. While similarities of 
industrial structures between Korea and Japan are the highest 
among the three countries, industrial similarities between China 
and Korea, and those between China and Japan have increased 
over time. Therefore, based on our analyses of industrial similarities 
and regional trade bias, we can suggest that the possible economic 
integration in NEA can proceed in the order of a Korea-Japan FTA, 
followed by a Korea-China FTA, leading finally to the birth of the 
NEA FTA. However, we cannot expect that formation of FTA among 
three countries follow this order in the real world, since FTA 
negotiations depend on economic as well as political reasons.
Various studies have tried to calculate the potential welfare 
effects that the China-Korea-Japan FTA will bring to its member 
countries. Table 5 compares the results in five studies. Two of the 
studies concluded that China would get the most benefits from an 
NEA FTA, while the other three suggested that Korea would be the 
biggest winner. Japan, due to its high existing income level, would 
not experience income growth as rapid as that of China and Korea 
in the potential China-Korea-Japan FTA. However, all the study 
results showed that the potential FTA would bring positive effects 
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TABLE 5
INCOME EFFECTS OF THE CHINA-KOREA-JAPAN FTA, IN PERCENTAGES　










China 1.71-3.08 0.03-1.05 0.89 2.09 1.3
Korea 3.1-5.15 1.29-4.73 0.2 0.8 3.2
Japan 0.75-1.43 0.03-0.16 0.03 0.25 0.2
Note: The figures are expected per capita GDP growth rates. 
to all three member countries’ income level.
These reported potential gains confirm the need for the three 
major NEA economies to drive for closer economic integration. With 
Korea’s intermediary position geographically and economically, and 
arguably also politically, it can act as a bridge in the three-party 
negotiations. The successful instigation of the China-ASEAN FTA 
should give China much relevant experience for its future dealing 
with the China-Korea-Japan economic integration. China can also 
take an active part in the NEA economic integration as it has done 
with the establishment of the China-ASEAN FTA. 
Some powerful regional blocs such as the EU are going to 
expand. Enlargement has become a trend of regionalism in the 
world economy. The potential China-Korea-Japan FTA is the key to 
the eventual creation of an enlarged East Asian FTA. Arguments 
have been presented as to who should lead the East Asian 
economic integration: Japan, China, or ASEAN. However, in our 
opinion, economic integration as a step toward a freer East Asia 
will proceed best with the existing China-ASEAN FTA and a future 
China-Korea-Japan FTA operating in harmony as the left and right 
hands of regional development, preferably in the near future. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the industrial structure of 
China and compared it with that of Korea and Japan. With its 
rapid growth, China has become an increasingly open and 
important economy in the world. Although low-technology industries 
still dominate China’s international trade competitiveness, high- 
technology industries have grown rapidly in China. Since the early 
1990s, China has become a net exporter of high-technology 
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products and the share of high-technology exports in China’s total 
manufactured exports reached 27.1% in 2003. However, China 
continued to be a net importer in the medium-technology 
industries. It shows that China’s industrial structure was somewhat 
like “pot-shaped.” When we regrouped the high- and medium-
high-technology industries together, clear gaps appeared between 
China, Korea, and Japan. Nevertheless, a converging tendency was 
also discerned because of the on-going rapid economic development 
of China and Korea. 
IIT is used as a measure of similarities in industrial structures 
among countries. We thus adopted the IIT index as a working 
indicator in sequencing trading partners to form free trade areas. In 
the three pairs of bilateral IIT indices among three countries, Korea 
and Japan shared the highest bilateral IIT indices, while China and 
Japan shared the lowest bilateral IIT indices. However, the bilateral 
IIT indices among the three countries were approximately double 
those with the rest of the world, indicating the clear benefits of a 
China-Korea-Japan FTA.
Regional trade bias was higher than one in the China-Korea- 
Japan region, though still lower than that of NAFTA and the EU. 
Our regression analysis of gravity equation proved that IIT tended 
to boost bilateral trade flows, i.e., China, Korea, and Japan tended 
to trade more heavily among themselves than with the rest of the 
world. Moreover, this tendency tended to become stronger and more 
significant. 
Based on the above analyses, we suggest a step-by-step strategy 
for the economic integration of East Asia in which a China-Korea- 
Japan FTA can be realized through the initial establishment of 
Korea-Japan and China-Korea FTAs, followed by subsequent 
negotiations between these two FTAs. The successful development 
of such a China-Korea-Japan FTA, in tandem with the China- 
ASEAN FTA, should ensure the progress of a freer East Asia. 
(Received 13 June 2006; Revised 2 September 2006)
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Sources: Kim and Chang (2002), OECD STAN Indicators Documentation 
(Haveman 2005, http://www. haveman.org).
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
THE G42 ECONOMIES 
USA, Germany, Japan, China, UK, France, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, 
Mexico, Korea, Belgium, Luxembourg, China HK SAR, Spain,
Taiwan Province of China, Singapore, Malaysia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, 
Russian Fed, Sweden, Australia, Thailand, Ireland, Austria, Brazil, 
Indonesia, Norway, Denmark, Turkey, Philippines, Finland, Poland, Israel, 
United Arab Emirate, South Africa, Portugal, Iran, Czech Rep, Hungary, 
Argentina
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